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JURSIDICTION OF THE COURT 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 1953 §§ 54-7-15^ and 
54-7-16 (Supp. 1987), this Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals 
from the Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission")• 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the Commission was required to receive evidence 
of competitors1 specific costs of providing mobile telephone ser-
vice where it determined that it could protect the public from 
anti-competitive conduct without knowledge of those costs. 
II. Whether, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commission's findings, the cumulative testimony of five witnesses 
adducing detailed evidence regarding the number and types of 
mobile telephone suppliers offering services, their rates, 
general market shares and geographic areas served, adequately 
supported the Commission's findings of basic fact concerning the 
mobile telephone services market under the "evidence of any 
substance whatever" standard of review. 
III. Whether testimony based upon personal knowledge, expert 
opinion testimony and other reliable and trustworthy evidence 
excepted from the hearsay rule satisfied the requirement that the 
Commission's findings be supported by a residuum of legal evi-
dence competent in a court of law. 
-
/
 All statutory references in this brief will be to the 1986 
replacement volumes of the Utah Code Annotated 1953 ("U.C.A.") 
unless otherwise noted. 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The interpretation of U.C.A. § 54-7-16 (Supp. 1987) and 
U.C.A. § 54-8b-3 is determinative of the issues presented. These 
statutes are set forth in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case involves the Commission's application of 
U.C.A. § 54-8b-3 in its decision to partially exempt mobile 
telephone service from regulation by allowing pricing flexibility 
to regulated competitors in seven geographic areas of the State. 
The case is before the Court on the petition of David R. Williams 
dba Industrial Communications ("Industrial") seeking review of 
the Commission's Report and Order. A copy of the Report and 
Order is included in the Addendum. 
Proceedings and Disposition Below 
The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company 
("Mountain Bell") initiated a proceeding on August 9, 1985 seeking 
an order exempting it from regulation with regard to mobile 
telephone service and rural radio service. The petition was 
filed pursuant to U.C.A. §§ 54-8b-l et seq. NewVector Communica-
tions; Inc. ("NewVector"),-/ Industrial and Mobile Telephone, 
Inc. ("Mobile")-^ intervened. The Commission decided that the 
—' NewVector changed its name during the pendency of the pro-
ceedings below to U S WEST NewVector Group, Inc. 
-/ Mobile was acquired during the pendency of the proceedings 
below by Daniels and Associates. 
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matter should be treated as a generic proceeding so that exemp-
tion from regulation of all mobile telephone services could be 
considered. 
Mountain Bell was unable to implement an accounting 
system to allocate joint and common costs between its fully regu-
lated basic telephone service and its mobile telephone and rural 
radio services within the time frame initially contemplated. It 
therefore changed its initial request for full exemption from 
regulation to a request that the Commission merely grant pricing 
flexibility by exempting price levels from tariff requirements. 
The service would remain regulated in all other respects. 
Hearings were held on November 13 and 14, 1986 and 
January 20, 1987. Mountain Bell presented the testimony of 
Messrs. James H. Murphy and Larry F. Fuller. The Division of 
Public Utilities ("Division") presented the testimony of Mr. 
Robert Capshaw and Dr. George R. Compton. Industrial presented 
the testimony of Mr. David R. Williams. Mobile submitted evi-
dence in the form of a proffer, without objection. 
On August 17, 1987, the Commission issued a Report and 
Order based on the evidence on the record and pursuant to U.C.A. 
§§ 54-8b-l et seg. exempting price levels from tariffs for mobile 
telephone service in Moab, Monticello, Ogden, Price, Provo, Salt 
Lake City and Vernal and surrounding areas. Price levels for 
mobile telephone service in other parts of the state were not 
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exempted from tariff requirements. Mobile telephone service 
otherwise remained subject to full regulation with respect to 
earnings, non-price terms and conditions of service, reliability, 
quality, safety, and facilities. Rural radio service was not 
exempted from any regulatory requirement. 
Statement of Facts 
The following facts are taken from the evidence 
received by the Commission during the proceedings below, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings. 
Mobile telephone services are offered in the State of 
Utah by some 29 suppliers. Record at 18-19, 735, 756 & 771.^ 
There are four basic types of suppliers: (1) wireline common 
carriers ("WCCs"), such as Mountain Bell and Continental 
Telephone (R. 772 & 788); (2) radio common carriers ("RCCs"), 
including Industrial, Mobile and Royce Electronics (R. 771 & 
786); (3) specialized mobile radio services ("SMRs"), including 
19 suppliers (R. 771 & 784); and (4) cellular common carriers 
("CCCs"), such as NewVector and Salt Lake City Cellular Telephone 
Company ("Cellular One") (R. 772 & 790). Only wireline common 
carriers (WCCs) and radio common carriers (RCCs) were subject to 
full and continuing regulation by the Commission. R. 736. 
Specialized mobile radio services (SMRs) are not classified as 
common carriers and are unregulated by the Commission. R. 73 6 & 
53. Pursuant to U.C.A. § 54-2-1(30), cellular common carriers 
-/ Hereinafter cited as "R. ." 
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(CCCs) were to be completely deregulated as of September 1987. 
R. 138-39. 
From the point of view of the mobile telephone user, the 
services provided by WCCs, RCCs, SMRs and CCCs are substantially 
the same. R. 18-19, 34, 138-39, 158, 161 & 746. All provide 
customers with the capability of making and receiving local and 
long distance telephone calls from mobile telephone units. R. 
393-94. The rates, terms and conditions of the four types of 
service are comparable. R. 32-33, 812 & 825-28. Recently, 
Mountain Bell experienced a decline in its mobile telephone 
customers, primarily as a result of competition from SMRs and 
CCCs, both relative newcomers to the mobile telephone industry. 
R. 30-31, 80-81, 166, 781 & 823. At the same time, the market 
for mobile telephone services was expanding. R. 18, 166, 209, 
808 & 823. Regulatory requirements for implementing price 
changes hampered Mountain Bell's ability to respond quickly and 
effectively to price changes by unregulated competitors. R. 39, 
72-73, 159 & 764-67. 
Based upon the number of mobile telephones in service 
for each regulated supplier and upon the number of channels for 
which all suppliers are licensed, no single supplier has a predo-
minant share of the mobile telephone market in Utah. R. 773-74 & 
846. In 1985, Industrial had 581 mobile telephones in service 
and 18 channels (R. 274-75 & 846), compared to 234 mobile 
telephones and 23 channels for Mobile (R. 335 & 846) and 393 
mobile telephones and 16 channels for Mountain Bell. R. 35 & 846. 
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Mountain Bell's share of the state-wide mobile telephone market, 
including SMRs and CCCs, was estimated at less than 5 percent (R. 
31 & 773-74), and the market share of all WCCs and RCCs was esti-
mated at 30 percent. R. 18. 
In each of the seven geographic areas where rates were 
detariffed, mobile telephone services were offered by two or more 
regulated suppliers (i.e., one WCC and one or more RCCs). R. 169 
& 791. In four of the detariffed areas, competition was also 
provided by one or more unregulated carriers (i.e., SMRs or 
CCCs). R. 791. 
Based upon the above evidence, the Commission found, in 
accordance with U.C.A. § 54-8b-3(2), that in each of the detar-
iffed areas: 
(1) mobile telephone services are subject to 
effective competition; 
(2) customers desiring such services have reason-
able alternatives readily available to them; 
(3) no provider of such services has a captive 
customer base; and 
(4) exempting mobile telephone services from the 
requirement of filing prices and gaining prior approval of 
pricing changes is in the public interest. 
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT 
Mountain Bell and NewVector submit: first, that the 
Commission's Report and Order complied with the requirements of 
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U.C.A. § 54-8b-3(2). The Report and Order as well as the record 
demonstrate that the Commission considered all the statutory ele-
ments, including cost of providing service, in arriving at its 
decision. The Public Telecommunications Utility Law, U.C.A. 
§§ 54-8b-l et seq. (the "Act"), was intended to provide the 
Commission with discretion and flexibility in regulating the 
increasingly competitive and rapidly changing telecommunications 
industry. The Act should be interpreted consistent with that 
intent and not in a manner that unreasonably restricts the 
Commission's ability to allow regulated utilities freedom to com-
pete. 
Second, the record fully supported the Commission's 
findings of fact. The evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the findings, demonstrated that mobile telephone 
service was offered by alternative suppliers at competitive rates 
and terms in seven areas of the state. Therefore, there was 
ample support for the Commission's conclusion that rates for 
mobile telephone service could be detariffed in those areas. 
Third, the Commission's Report and Order was based upon 
competent evidence. Industrial's claim that the decision was 
premised solely upon inadmissible hearsay is incorrect. The vast 
majority of the evidence was competent, being based upon personal 
knowledge, expert opinion or reliable and trustworthy evidence 
excepted from the hearsay rule. The hearsay evidence received by 
the Commission was corroborated by competent evidence. 
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The Commission considered all statutory factors in 
making the decision and received adequate competent evidence to 
support its findings. Therefore, the decision should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY CONSIDERED ALL 
STATUTORY FACTORS INCLUDING THE COST 
OF PROVIDING MOBILE TELEPHONE SERVICE 
Industrial argues that the Report and Order is defective 
because the Commission did not receive evidence regarding each of 
the factors specified by the relevant statute, U.C.A. § 54-8b-3(2). 
See Brief of Petitioner at 9 (hereinafter "Br."). However, 
Industrial's only specific complaint is that the Commission could 
not have considered the cost of providing mobile telephone ser-
vice as required by U.C.A. § 54-8b-3(2)(i) because it did not 
require Mountain Bell to submit, on the public record, its costs. 
Br. 7-10. Industrial's argument is based upon a misinterpreta-
tion of the statute and ignores evidence received and other mat-
ters considered with respect to cost of providing mobile 
telephone service. 
A. Section 54-8b-3(2)(i) Does Not Require The Commission To 
Receive Evidence Of Specific Costs. 
The pertinent statute, U.C.A. § 54-8b-3(2), states: 
(2) The commission, on its own initiative or 
in response to an application by a telecom-
munications corporation or a user of a public 
telecommunications service, may, after public 
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, make 
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findings and issue an order specifying its 
requirements, terms, and conditions exempting 
any telecommunications corporation or any 
public telecommunications service from any 
requirement of this title either for a specific 
geographic area or in the entire state if the 
commission finds that the telecommunications 
corporation or service is subject to effective 
competition, that customers of the telecommuni-
cations corporation or service have reasonably 
available alternatives, and that the telecom-
munications corporation or service does not serve 
a captive customer base, and if such exemption 
is in the public interest of the citizens of 
the state. In determining whether to exempt 
any telecommunications corporation or public 
telecommunications service from any requirement 
of this title, the commission shall consider 
all relevant factors including, but not limited 
to: (a) the number of other providers offering 
similar services; (b) the intrastate market 
power and market share within the state of 
Utah of the telecommunications corporation 
requesting an exemption; (c) the intrastate 
market power and market share of other providers; 
(d) the existence of other providers to make 
functionally equivalent services readily avail-
able at competitive rates, terms, and conditions; 
(e) the effect of exemption on the regulated 
revenue requirements of the telecommunications 
corporation requesting an exemption; (f) the 
ease of entry of other providers into the 
marketplace; (g) the overall impact of exemption 
on the public interest; (h) the integrity of 
all service providers in the proposed market; 
(i) the cost of providing such service; (j) the 
economic impact on existing telecommunications 
corporations; and (k) whether competition will 
promote the provision of adequate services at 
just and reasonable rates. 
In interpreting the statute, the Commission first 
observed that the Public Telecommunications Utility Law, U.C.A. 
§§ 54-8b-l et seq., was intended to be a flexible tool which 
allowed it discretion to exempt wholly or in part any requirement 
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of regulation in the rapidly changing telecommunications 
industry. R. 519-20. Referring to Section 54-8b-3(2), the 
Commission stated that it was required to support any exemption 
order with findings on the four criteria specified in the first 
part of the subsection, but that the four criteria contained 
terms that could only be defined in the context of a particular 
case. R. 520-21. The Commission then determined that subparts 
(a) through (k) of Section 54-8b-3(2) did not require findings, 
were not separate and apart from the four essential criteria 
(i.e., almost all eleven factors are indicators of competition), 
were intended as a general guide of items to be considered, and 
in some cases were general policy considerations that could not 
be expressed in precise factual terms. R. 522-23. The Commis-
sion therefore concluded that the statute did not mean that each 
of the eleven factors would necessarily be relevant in any given 
case. R. 522. 
It is apparent in reviewing paragraph 15.g of the Report 
and Order in light of the Commission's interpretation of the 
statute that the Commission concluded that a factor can be first 
considered for its relevancy in a particular case. If upon such 
consideration it is determined that the factor is irrelevant, the 
Commission need not receive specific substantive evidence on the 
factor in order to find that sufficient competition exists to 
grant a full or partial exemption from regulation. 
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Industrial argues that the Commission, in determining 
that specific knowledge of providers1 costs was irrelevant in 
deciding the partial exemption issue before it, misinterpreted 
the statute. Industrial interprets the statute to require that 
evidence of providers1 costs had to be received for the factor 
to be properly considered. However, the statute does not require 
the Commission to receive evidence for each factor specified in 
Section 54-8b-3(2); it requires only that the Commission consider 
those factors along with all other relevant factors. 
This Court accords deference to the Commission's 
interpretation of statutes the Commission is empowered to admi-
nister. In Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public 
Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 at 610 (Utah 1983) ["Wexpro II"], 
the Court stated: 
An agency's interpretation of key provisions 
of the statute it is empowered to administer 
is often inseparable from its application of 
the rules of law to basic facts . . . . In 
reviewing decisions such as these, a court 
should afford great deference to the technical 
expertise or more extensive experience of the 
responsible agency. 
Id. at 610, citing Salt Lake Corp. v. Department of Employment 
Security, 657 P.2d 761 (1982); Central Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Brimhall, 497 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1972). 
Here, the Commission considered the subject of the cost 
of providing mobile telephone service pursuant to Section 
54-8b-3(2) (i), but reasoned that evidence of specific costs was 
not necessary. The Commission interpreted Section 54-8b-3(2) to 
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mean that it must consider the enumerated issues in reaching its 
decision, but that it did not need to receive specific evidence 
on each enumerated factor. R. 531. The Commission's technical 
expertise concerning the relationship between competitiveness and 
costs in the mobile telephone industry merits deference from this 
Court. 
The Wexpro II Court stated that in reviewing the Com-
mission 's interpretation of a special law "the reasonableness of 
the Commission's order must be viewed in light of the statutory 
setting in which it operates." Wexpro II, 658 P.2d at 611, 
quoting Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 368 
P.2d 590, 592 (Utah 1962). The statutory setting here requires 
the Commission to consider a number of factors in deciding 
whether exemption from regulation is appropriate. As observed by 
the Commission, a reading of the entire Public Telecommunications 
Utility Law, makes it clear that the Commission is to have broad 
discretion and flexibility in making this determination. The Act 
grants the Commission authority to exempt providers or services 
from regulation in whole or in part. Exemption may be statewide 
or limited to certain areas as it was in this case. It may be 
unqualified or subject to "requirements, terms and conditions." 
U.C.A. § 54-8b-3. The Commission may allow a public utility to 
negotiate with a customer for services at a price or on terms 
different from those offered to the public generally if the 
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customer is attempting to obtain the services elsewhere. U.C.A. 
§ 54-8b-4. The Commission may reconsider its exemption decisions 
at anytime and revoke or modify them in the public interest. 
U.C.A. § 54-8b-7. 
Industrial's view of how the Commission must consider 
the factors enumerated in Section 54-8b-3(2) would unnecessarily 
restrict the Commission's ability to approach exemption decisions 
under the statute with the flexibility obviously intended by the 
legislature. It would eliminate the Commission's power, as per-
mitted by this Court, to use its technical sophistication to 
determine whether a factor is relevant or determinative in a 
given case. The factors enumerated in Section 54-8b-3(2) for the 
Commission to consider overlap, and evidence pertaining to one 
factor would also affect other factors. For example, Section 
54-8b-3(2)(g) requires that the Commission consider "the overall 
impact of exemption on the public interest." Because the 
Commission is required to consider a diverse spectrum of over-
lapping factors in an exemption decision, this Court should allow 
the Commission latitude in determining how much attention a par-
ticular factor deserves. To affix a rigid evidentiary minimum 
for each consideration mentioned in Section 54-8b-3(2), as argued 
by Industrial, would place the Commission in a straitjacket. 
B. The Commission Adequately Considered The Cost Of Providing 
Mobile Telephone Service. 
Paragraph 15.g of the Report and Order demonstrates that 
the Commission considered the cost of providing mobile telephone 
service in arriving at its decision. Paragraph 15.g states: 
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As part of our regulatory oversight, we 
must assure that the mobile service of 
Mountain Bell or other carriers is not sub-
sidized by other regulated services. Mountain 
Bell has committed to provide its mobile ser-
vices above its direct costs. As part of our 
regulatory oversight role in the ratemaking 
process for Mountain Bell's regulated ser-
vices , we will, in future ratemaking pro-
ceedings, assure ourselves that these 
commitments are met. While cost may be a 
relevant factor in our ongoing oversight role, 
we do not believe it is necessary or relevant 
that we review specific cost data to determine 
whether exemption should be allowed, since, 
as Dr. Compton correctly points out, if it 
can be shown that a market is competitive 
"a regulatory decision to grant pricing flexi-
bility requires no specific knowledge about 
providers' costs." 
R. 531. 
Thus, the Commission specifically considered the reason 
for reviewing the cost of providing service and concluded that it 
is principally to avoid the subsidization of competitive services 
partially exempted from regulation by fully regulated services. 
The Commission was well aware that Mountain Bell was the only 
competitor in the mobile telephone market that also provided 
other fully regulated services that could be used to subsidize 
its mobile telephone prices. Such subsidization would have 
violated Section 54-8b-6. But Mountain Bell committed that it 
would continue to offer mobile telephone service at prices above 
its direct costs (R. 531), and the Commission received and con-
sidered evidence that a breach of that commitment would be unli-
kely. R. 148, 163-64, 178 & 181-84. Therefore, the Commission's 
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only valid concern was whether it could monitor Mountain Bell to 
determine whether it was selling above cost. On that point, it 
was clear that granting Mountain Bell pricing flexibility would 
not exempt its mobile operations, including the costs and earnings 
of those operations, from regulatory control and scrutiny.-/ 
The Commission considered the testimony of Dr. Compton explicitly 
addressing the relevancy of the cost issue. R. 815-17. 
Certainly the Commission's analysis and its receipt and con-
sideration of evidence amounted to consideration of the issue of 
the cost of providing mobile telephone service as required by 
U.C.A. § 54-8b-3(2)(i). 
Industrial's argument that the Commission erred by not 
requiring Mountain Bell to present testimony regarding its costs 
(Br. 13-14) is ironic for three reasons. First, during cross 
examination of Mountain Bell's witness, counsel for Industrial 
requested information concerning, not Mountain Bell's mobile 
telephone costs, but its profitability. R. 98. Mr. Murphy 
refused to reveal the information claiming it was proprietary and 
confidential. R. 99-100. Counsel for Mountain Bell objected to 
Industrial's motion to compel an answer on the grounds that pro-
bitability was not relevant or a factor specified to be con-
sidered under Section 54-8b-3(2). R. 101. Had Industrial sought 
-
/
 The Commission clearly has the power to consider information 
relating to subsidization at anytime. U.C.A. § 54-8b-6. Given 
the statutory power to re-regulate services exempted from any 
regulatory requirements (U.C.A. § 54-8b-7), the Commission can 
monitor and investigate those services at anytime to assure 
itself that the exemption remains in the public interest. 
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and the Commission ordered production of cost information, 
Mountain Bell would have provided it.-' R. 100. 
Second, it is not only Mountain Bell's cost data that is 
potentially relevant as urged by Industrial. The cost data of 
all providers, including Industrial and Mobile, are relevant if 
Mountain Bell's costs are relevant. However, such production, 
unless done in a manner that could have kept it from the other 
parties to the proceeding, could have had potentially damaging 
effects on the very competition which was the basis for the par-
tial exemption from regulation. 
Third, Mountain Bell commonly provides cost evidence on 
the public record in regulatory proceedings. Its reluctance to 
do so here, and Industrial's reluctance to pursue the issue, 
apparently out of a concern that it might be called upon to 
respond in kind, is evidence in itself of the competitiveness of 
the mobile telephone market. 
These ironies reveal that Industrial's real concern 
is with competition, not with compliance with the statute. Thus, 
it attempts to compel the Commission through strict construction 
of the statute to require production of irrelevant evidence that 
competitors would rather not present, believing that competitors 
will refuse to produce the evidence thereby making it impossible 
for the Commission to grant exemptions to foster competition in 
-
y
 In response to discovery requests, Mountain Bell did provide 
its costs of providing mobile telephone service to the Division 
of Public Utilities under a protective order. 
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the marketplace for the benefit of the public. Section 
54-8b-3(2)'s findings and considerations are designed to ensure 
the public that competition will serve as a substitute for regu-
lation, not to protect public utilities from competition. 
Certainly, the Commission is accorded enough discretion by its 
enabling statute (Section 54-4-1) and by Section 54-8b-3 not to 
be forced to spread on the public record evidence that might 
damage competition which it finds in the public interest if it 
can consider the issue in another way and satisfy itself that the 
purposes of the statute are met. 
II. 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF BASIC FACT 
ARE AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
Wexpro II# 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983), established two 
separate standards of review for findings of fact, distinguishing 
between questions of "basic fact" and questions of "ultimate 
fact." In determining the standard of review to be applied to 
questions of basic fact, the Court first looked to the following 
language of U.C.A. § 54-7-16,-/ the statutory grant of authority 
to review Commission decisions: 
-
/
 In 1987, this statute was amended without substantive change. 
The portion quoted in Wexpro II appears at subsection (3) of the 
current version. U.C.A. § 54-7-16 (Supp. 1987). This statute 
governs this appeal even though it is effective only until 
January 1, 1988, the effective date of the newly enacted Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act, U.C.A. §§ 63-46b-1 to 21 (Supp. 
1987). U.C.A. § 63-46b-22, 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 102 (July 20, 1987); 
1987 Utah Laws, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 5 (S.B. No. 8). 
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The review shall not be extended further 
than to determine whether the commission has 
regularly pursued its authority, including a 
determination of whether the order or decision 
under review violates any right of the peti-
tioner under the Constitution of the United 
States or of the state of Utah* The find-
ings and conclusions of the commission on 
questions of fact shall be final and shall not 
be subject to review. Such questions of 
fact shall include ultimate facts and the fin-
dings and conclusions of the commission on 
reasonableness and discrimination. 
Id. at 607-08 (emphasis added). Based upon the above statute, 
principles of administrative law and its own prior decisions, 
the Court determined that 
[t]he greatest degree of deference is extended 
to the Commission's findings on questions of 
basic fact . . . . Here we apply the scope of 
review specified in the second sentence of 
§ 54-7-16, quoted above. While the statutory 
language "final and . . . not . . . subject to 
review" has not been interpreted literally to 
foreclose all judicial review of Commission 
findings of fact, it does preclude such review 
in most cases. 
Id. at 608-09 (emphasis added). After discussing the language of 
previous decisions in which Commission factual findings were 
reviewed, the Court concluded: 
The standard of review that affirms Commission 
findings on questions of basic fact if they 
are supported by "evidence of any substance 
whatever" and sets them aside only if they are 
"without foundation in fact" is the standard 
this Court will follow in reviewing the 
Commission's findings of basic facts in this 
case. 
Id. at 609. 
Industrial argues that the Commission's findings in this 
case do not satisfy the "substantial evidence" test articulated 
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in Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public Service 
Commission, 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981). Br. 18. Mountain States 
predates Wexpro II and can be construed properly only in light of 
the comprehensive analysis of standards of review of administra-
tive orders contained in Wexpro II. In Wexpro II, the court 
specifically distinguished the standard for review of findings of 
basic fact from the substantial evidence test, stating: 
This high threshold of review provides less 
latitude for judicial review of Commission 
findings of basic facts than the "substantial 
evidence" standard specified in the Federal 
Administrative Procedure Act. 
Wexpro II at 609. Rather, the Court analogized its standard to 
the "no basis in fact" standard applied by federal courts in 
reviewing federal agency decisions and to the "arbitrary and 
capricious test," the "narrowest" of the three recognized for-
mulas for review of findings of fact. Id. at 609 & n. 12. 
The Wexpro II decision makes it clear that, in reviewing 
the Commission's order in Mountain States, the Court was exa-
mining, not questions of basic fact, but whether the Commis-
sion's findings of fact supported its ultimate conclusion. See 
Wexpro II at 611 & n. 17. The issue in Mountain States was 
whether it was "just and reasonable" to establish preferential 
electrical rates for senior citizens as a subclass of residen-
tial customers. Rather than reviewing the record to determine 
whether there was "any evidence whatsoever" to support the 
Commission's findings, the Court in Mountain States applied a 
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test of rationality to the Commission's ultimate conclusion to 
determine whether as "a matter of logic or completeness" it was 
supported by the findings. Wexpro II at 611 & n. 17. 
Here, Industrial seeks to upset 11 out of 18 enumerated 
findings of fact in the Commission's Report and Order. The ele-
ven challenged findings include both "basic fact" and "ultimate 
fact. "-^ / in questioning these findings, Industrial urges the 
Court not to determine whether the findings of basic fact support 
the Commission's findings of ultimate fact, but to examine the 
record to determine whether the evidence supports the 
Commission's findings of basic fact. The ultimate facts are 
challenged only because Industrial believes the basic facts from 
which they logically and reasonably flow are erroneous. The 
appropriate standard of review for such an inquiry is the 
"evidence of any substance whatever" test—the most deferential 
of all standards of review. 
A. The Commission's Finding That Various Providers Offer 
Functionally Equivalent Mobile Telephone Service Is Well 
Supported By The Evidence. 
Industrial contends that there is no record evidence to 
support the Commission's Finding of Fact No. 2 that "several 
types of entities," i.e., wireline common carriers (WCCs), radio 
common carriers (RCCs), specialized mobile radio services (SMRs) 
-
/
 Finding of Fact Nos. 2, 3, 5, 7 & 9 clearly constitute fin-
dings of basic fact. Finding of Fact No. 16 clearly constitutes 
a finding of ultimate fact. The remaining findings challenged, 
Finding of Fact Nos. 6, 8, 10, 14 & 15, contain some findings of 
"basic fact" and may contain some findings of "ultimate fact." 
20 
and cellular common carriers (CCCs), "offer functionally equiva-
lent types of mobile radio service."-^ This contention is based 
upon a misinterpretation of U.C.A. § 54-8b-3(2)(d) and ignores 
the substantial evidence in the record that CCCs and SMRs are 
functionally equivalent to and competitive with WCCs and RCCs. 
1. Industrial Misinterprets U.C.A. § 54-8b-3(2)(d). 
Industrial asserts that U.C.A. § 54-8b-3(2)(d) defines 
functionally equivalent services as those that are "readily 
available at competitive rates, terms and conditions." Br. 18. 
Contrary to this assertion, U.C.A. § 54-8b-3(2)(d) provides that, 
in determining whether to exempt any telecommunications service 
from regulation, the Commission "shall consider," among other fac-
tors, "the existence of other providers to make functionally 
equivalent services readily available at competitive rates, terms 
and conditions." This provision obviously contemplates that 
functionally equivalent services could be provided at non-
competitive rates, terms and conditions. Competitive rates, 
terms and conditions are not part of the definition of functional 
equivalence, but are merely factors the Commission should con-
sider in making its required finding that customers have reason-
ably available alternatives. U.C.A. § 54-8b-3(2). 
-
/
 This finding is a partial basis for the Commission's required 
finding that customers have reasonably available alternatives. 
U.C.A. § 54-8b-3(2). In addition, it must find that the func-
tionally equivalent services are available at competitive rates, 
terms and conditions. See Point II.A.1, infra. 
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2. Substantial Evidence Demonstrated that CCCs and SMRs 
Are Functionally Equivalent And Competitive With The 
Regulated Carriers, 
Industrial challenges the Commissions finding that 
"several types of entities offer functionally equivalent types of 
mobile radio service" on the ground that neither SMRs nor CCCs 
are functionally equivalent to the regulated carriers (WCCs and 
RCCs). Specific evidence was adduced, however, supporting the 
Commission's finding that both SMRs and CCCs provide mobile tele-
phone services functionally equivalent to those provided by WCCs 
and RCCs. 
James H. Murphy, District Staff Manager of Product 
Development—Radio Services for Mountain Bell, with over 14 years 
experience in the mobile telephone business (R. 11 & 108), 
testified that WCCs, RCCs, CCCs and SMRs all offer "the same or 
like" mobile telephone services to the public. R. 735, 746 & 
756. Mr. Murphy's testimony was supplemented and buttressed 
by the testimony of Robert B. Capshaw, Communications Engineer 
for the Division of Public Utilities. Mr. Capshaw testified that 
a user of mobile radio services has four basic alternatives to 
the service provided by a WCC: cellular, RCC, SMR or private 
radio service. R. 161. According to Mr. Capshaw, SMRs and CCCs 
provide functionally equivalent services to the mobile telephone 
service offered by Mountain Bell. R. 138-139. 
Contrary to Industrial's contention that the record "is 
absolutely barren" of evidence that WCCs, RCCs, SMRs and CCCs 
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were "readily available at competitive rates, terms and condi-
tions" (Br. 17), the Commission considered abundant evidence 
regarding the cost of various mobile radio services. Mr. Murphy 
testified that a potential SMR user would have to invest up to 
$1,200 in equipment and $10 to $50 in monthly fees to obtain 
SMR service. R. 32-33. In addition, Dr. George R. Compton, 
Manager of Economists for the Division, submitted specific rate 
information for NewVector (CCC), Mobile (RCC), Industrial (RCC) 
and Mountain Bell (WCC) (R. 826-28) and testified that "[i]t is 
obvious that the rates are comparable, as would be expected given 
alternative suppliers in the major market areas and noncaptive 
customers." R. 812. 
Additional evidence was adduced demonstrating the com-
petitiveness of SMRs and CCCs with WCCs and RCCs. Mr. Murphy 
testified that Mountain Bell's number of mobile telephone custo-
mers had decreased in the last year and that the "root of 
[Mountain Bell's] declining market share" was "the advance of the 
cellular common carriers, the CCCs, and the SMR carriers in the 
Utah marketplace, who were not here five years ago." R. 30-31. 
Mr. Murphy stated that he was familiar "generically" with SMRs 
and that RCCs, SMRs and WCCs are all in competition for the same 
"people in motion marketplace." R. 32-34. Mr. Capshaw testified 
that CCCs were the largest competitor to WCCs and RCCs in the 
metropolitan area (R. 138) and that the "proliferation" of SMRs 
in the mobile telephone market has been "tending to increase." 
R. 161. Mr. Capshaw stated that, although SMRs "don't . . . have 
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to be given the same weight11 as other providers in assessing the 
competition in mobile telephone services, "they have to be taken 
into account" and that the regulated entities are put at a 
"competitive disadvantage if they are not able to rapidly respond 
to pricing initiatives that may be taken by these deregulated 
entities [SMRs and CCCs]." R. 159. 
Industrial's contention that SMRs and CCCs do not offer 
functionally equivalent mobile telephone services is based in 
part on the argument that, because SMRs and CCCs are unregulated, 
they cannot be regarded as functionally equivalent competitors of 
WCCs and RCCs. Br. 19. This argument completely overlooks the 
central problem the proceedings below were initiated to address: 
precisely because SMRs and CCCs were unregulated, they held a 
significant competitive advantage over the regulated carriers, 
whose market share was declining as a result. The Public Tele-
communication Utility Law was enacted to allow the Commission to 
deal with this type of problem by granting exemptions from regu-
lation in competitive markets. 
Ample evidence supports the Commission's finding that 
"[s]everal types of entities," including SMRs and CCCs "offer 
functionally equivalent types of mobile radio service." 
B. The Commission's Findings That Mobile Telephone Services Are 
Subject to Effective Competition In Ogden, Provo, Vernal, 
Moab, And Monticello Are Well-Founded. 
Industrial challenges Findings of Fact No. 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10 and 14 alleging that the record demonstrates that there is no 
effective competition in Ogden, Provo, Vernal, Moab or 
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Monticello.-^/ This argument ignores evidence in the record 
regarding competition between regulated providers and the 
Commission's determination (Finding of Fact No. 2) that SMRs and 
CCCs are functionally equivalent to and competitive with WCCs and 
RCCs. See Part 2 of Point II.A, supra. 
At the hearing below, the cumulative testimony of four 
witnesses was that, in each of the seven detariffed areas, there 
was competition between two or more regulated common carriers, 
i.e., a WCC and one or more RCCs. Three of these witnesses 
further testified that in four of the detariffed areas (Provo, 
Salt Lake City, Ogden and Vernal) various unregulated providers, 
i.e., SMRs or CCCs, or both, offered services functionally equiva-
lent to and competitive with those offered by the WCCs and RCCs. 
Based upon personal knowledge, Mr. Capshaw testified 
that competitive alternatives to Mountain Bell's service were 
available in the Provo, Salt Lake, Ogden, Price and Vernal areas. 
R. 158. Dr. Compton testified that there is "known competition" 
among "multiple regulated common carriers" in Moab, Monticello, 
— ' Although Industrial challenges Finding of Fact No. 3, which 
finds that various providers offer functionally equivalent mobile 
telephone services in the Salt Lake City area, it does not 
challenge the Commission's further findings that mobile telephone 
services are subject to effective competition, that customers 
have readily available reasonable alternatives, and that there is 
no captive customer base in the Salt Lake City area. Finding of 
Fact No. 4. Thus, Industrial apparently concedes that there is 
effective competition in the mobile telephone market in the Salt 
Lake City area which accounts for most of the mobile telephone 
service in the state. R. 758 & 791. It is, therefore, unne-
cessary for respondents to review the evidence regarding the Salt 
Lake City market in detail here. 
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Ogden, Price, Provo, Salt Lake City and Vernal—the precise areas 
exempted from tariffing by the Commission's Report and Order. R. 169. 
Based upon information published in the 1985 and 1986 
Mobile Communications Handbook, Mr. Murphy testified that mobile 
telephone services were provided in the detariffed areas by the 
following suppliers: 
Ogden - Mountain Bell (WCC), Mobile (RCC), Industrial (RCC), 
NewVector (CCC) and two SMRs. 
Salt Lake City - Mountain Bell (WCC), Industrial (RCC), 
Mobile (RCC), NewVector (CCC) and numerous SMRs. 
Provo - Mountain Bell (WCC), Industrial (RCC), Mobile (RCC) 
and two SMRs. 
Vernal - Mountain Bell (WCC), Industrial (RCC) and two SMRs. 
Price - Mountain Bell (WCC) and Royce Electronics (RCC). 
Moab and Monticello - Continental Telephone (WCC) and Royce 
Electronics (RCC). 
R. 736, 758, 772 & 791. 
This evidence demonstrated that in addition to the regu-
lated carriers, two SMRs offered mobile telephone services in 
both Ogden and Provo. In Ogden, mobile telephone services were 
further offered by a CCC.—' SMRs and CCCs are exceptionally 
effective competitors in the mobile telephone market. The pre-
sence of these unregulated carriers in Ogden and Provo fully sup-
ports the Commission's finding that these market areas were 
subject to effective competition. Industrial's assertion that 
Mountain Bell "has 100% of the market" and "services a captive 
— ' Another CCC, Cellular One, now offers substantial competi-
tion to the other providers in both Ogden and Salt Lake City. 
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customer base" in Ogden and Provo (Br. 20) simply ignores the 
evidence that SMRs and CCCs provide mobile telephone service in 
those areas. The Commission's finding that mobile telephone ser-
vices are subject to effective competition in these markets is 
sound. 
The basis for Industrial's claim that there is no effec-
tive competition in Ogden and Provo is that RCC customers would 
incur long distance charges in utilizing the service in these 
areas. Br. 20. This claim was considered by the Commission and 
discounted on the grounds that the RCCs are certificated and thus 
obligated to provide service in both Ogden and Provo, that they 
advertise for customers in those areas, that their radio systems 
do, in fact, provide service in Ogden and Provo— ' and that there 
are other alternatives in Ogden and Provo in any event. Finding 
of Fact Nos. 5 & 7. 
— ' These findings are fully supported by the testimony of Larry 
F. Fuller, Staff Manager of Rates, Tariffs and Regulatory Matters 
for Mountain Bell. R. 365-66, 369, 372 & 374. See also, R. 288 
(Williams' testimony). According to Mr. Fuller, Ogden- and 
Provo-based customers of Industrial's single transmitter system 
would incur long-distance charges only for calls from a land-line 
to their mobile unit, not vice versa. R. 371. This fact was 
corroborated by Mr. Williams, Industrial's witness. R. 287. 
Moreover, the RCCs had available an inexpensive method of obvi-
ating the alleged problem of long-distance charges: at a cost 
of $250 per month, they could subscribe to foreign exchange (FX) 
service which would provide dedicated land-lines from the Ogden 
or Provo central office to the Salt Lake City central office 
allowing persons in Ogden or Provo to access RCC mobile units 
without incurring long distance charges. R. 369-70 & 383. Mr. 
Williams admitted on cross-examination that Industrial could 
resolve the toll charge problem in Ogden and Provo, but had 
simply chosen not to do so. R. 286 & 350. Thus, Industrial's 
and Mobile's perceived competitive disadvantage in Ogden and 
Provo is de minimus. 
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Industrial's contentions regarding the Commission's 
findings as to mobile telephone services in Vernal (Finding of 
Fact No. 10) are also easily refuted by an examination of the 
record. As shown above, the evidence demonstrated that Mountain 
Bell and Industrial had equal shares of the Vernal market and 
that further competition was offered by one SMR. Industrial's 
own witness testified that Industrial had approximately 50 per-
cent of the regulated mobile telephone business in Vernal. R. 
299. Although Industrial contended that it was competitively 
disadvantaged in Vernal because Mountain Bell "refused" to 
cooperate in converting Industrial's manual system to an auto-
mated one, the evidence showed that Industrial had never even 
sought relief from the Commission for Mountain Bell's alleged 
refusal. R. 295-98. 
Industrial's bald assertion that the Commission's find-
ings regarding the Moab and Monticello areas (Finding of Fact No. 
14) are "wholly unsupported by the evidence and contrary to the 
uncontroverted evidence" is again incorrect. Specific evidence 
was adduced that two regulated carriers, i.e., Continental Tele-
phone (WCC) (R. 788-89) and Royce Electronics (RCC) (R. 758), 
shared the mobile telephone market in both of those areas. 
C. The Record Amply Supports The Commission's Finding That 
Neither Mountain Bell Nor Any Other Single Entity Dominates 
The Mobile Radio Market. 
Contrary to Industrial's contention, the Commission's 
finding in paragraph 15.b of the Report and Order that Mountain 
Bell does not possess "the kind of market power that would allow 
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it to dictate whatever price it chooses" was uncontroverted by 
Mr. Capshaw»s testimony. Mr. Capshaw addressed the combined mar-
ket power of Mountain Bell and NewVector in the event they merged 
their mobile telephone and cellular services and mobile telephone 
services were totally deregulated. R. 148. Such testimony was 
irrelevant to the Commission's decision to simply detariff mobile 
telephone services. The issues of total deregulation of mobile 
telephone services and a merger of Mountain Bell's and NewVector's 
mobile services were not before the Commission. 
Substantial evidence supports the Commission's findings 
that "no one entity [including Mountain Bell] has either a domi-
nant market share or market power." Based upon the number of 
channels for which each carrier was licensed, Mr. Murphy testi-
fied that Mountain Bell had a market share of less than 5 percent. 
R. 31 & 773-74. Based upon the annual reports of the regulated 
mobile telephone suppliers, Mr. Capshaw testified that Mountain 
Bell had "far less than half" of even the regulated portion of 
the market. R. 147 & 846. Industrial's own witness corroborated 
the essential point that Mountain Bell was not the largest or 
predominant supplier in the market, testifying that Industrial 
was licensed for 18 channels (R. 274-75), compared to Mountain 
Bell's 16 (R. 35) and Mobile's 23. R. 335.-^/ 
— ' Industrial objected to Mr. Murphy's testimony regarding 
market shares on the ground that Murphy had no knowledge of the 
number of customers served by each mobile telephone supplier. 
R. 112. This objection was substantially obviated by the testi-
mony of Mr. Capshaw, who testified as to market shares based upon 
the number of telephones each regulated supplier had in service. 
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Contrary to Industrial's claim, the Commission examined 
the Utah mobile telephone market, not only as a whole, but in 
each of the detariffed areas. Cumulative evidence was adduced 
that service was offered in each detariffed area by multiple 
regulated carriers and that four of the areas were also served 
by SMRs or CCCs. See Point II.B, supra. Additional testimony as 
to the competitive conditions in each of the markets further sup-
ports the Commission's findings. Jd. Contrary to Industrial's 
claim, none of the detariffed areas was served by only a single 
provider. 
D. Industrial Has Misconstrued Evidence Supporting The 
Commission's Finding That Barriers To Entering The 
Mobile Telephone Market Are Not Prohibitive. 
Industrial's final target is the Commission's finding 
that there is "no prohibitive financial burden to enter the 
[mobile telephone] market." This finding is again fully sup-
ported by the evidence. According to Mr. Murphy, radio channels 
are "easily available upon application" in Utah unlike other 
areas where the radio spectrum is totally exhausted (R. 33); the 
"personal communications or people in motion marketplace [is] 
expanding" (R. 38) and the initial "start-up" cost to enter the 
market is not high. R. 39. Industrial's claim that Mr. Capshaw 
and Dr. Compton disputed Mr. Murphy's testimony on this point is 
simply erroneous. In stating that "I don't believe we can ever 
have two competitors within [a] small town" (R. 143), Mr. Capshaw 
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was clearly referring to areas such as Blanding and Richfield 
where only one carrier is in operation—areas excluded from the 
Commission's rate detariffing order. Industrial has similarly 
taken Dr. Compton's testimony out of context. Dr. Compton stated 
that it would cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, not to enter 
the Salt Lake City market, but to "duplicate the business" of 
Industrial or Mobile in that market. R. 222. Even if Dr. 
Compton had been estimating the cost of entry into the mobile 
telephone market, however, such testimony would not controvert 
the Commission's finding that the cost was "not prohibitive." To 
the contrary, Mr. Murphy testified that the cost of entry was 
"not very much at all for an entrepreneur." R. 39. This fact is 
further corroborated by the recent entry of several SMRs and two 
CCCs into the marketplace. 
E. Conclusion on Findings. 
In summary, each of the Commission's findings of fact is 
supported by evidence more than sufficient to uphold the findings 
under the "evidence of any substance whatever" standard of 
review.—' In attacking the Commission's findings, Industrial has 
— ' Industrial challenges Finding of Fact No. 16, asserting 
merely that as "a conclusion of law, . . . it is erroneous as a 
matter of law." Br. 23. In Finding of Fact No. 16, the 
Commission found that "detariffing of mobile rates in seven areas 
will promote competitive pricing conditions that are just and 
reasonable" and that "detariffing is therefore in the public 
interest." This finding is not purely a matter of law, but is a 
finding of "ultimate fact" that rationally and reasonably flows 
from the Commission's previous findings. Because Industrial has 
not attempted to articulate even a colorable ground for upsetting 
this finding, respondents have not addressed separately the evi-
dence and rationale supporting the finding in this brief. 
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assiduously ignored the substantial body of evidence supporting 
the findings, focusing solely upon evidence that could have been 
construed in favor of Industrial's position. Industrial vigor-
ously availed itself of the opportunity to quarrel with the evi-
dence at the hearing below. On appeal, however, the issue is not 
whether the Commission could have made findings contrary to those 
it actually made. Rather, the issue is whether the findings of 
basic fact are supported by "evidence of any substance whatever" 
and whether those findings reasonably and rationally support the 
Commission's ultimate findings and conclusions. Extensive testi-
mony was received by the Commission in support of its findings 
and the Report and Order must, therefore, be affirmed. 
III. 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY 
A RESIDUUM OF LEGAL EVIDENCE COMPETENT IN 
A COURT OF LAW 
Industrial asserts that literally all of the evidence 
received by the Commission constituted inadmissible hearsay and 
that not even "a residuum" of legal evidence competent in a court 
of law supports the Commission's findings. This assertion is 
belied by a record replete with evidence competent and admissible 
under the Utah Rules of Evidence ("URE"). 
In Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 339 
P.2d 1011, 1014 (Utah 1959), this Court held that hearsay evi-
dence was admissible in proceedings before the Commission, but 
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that Commission findings must be supported by "a residuum of 
legal evidence competent in a court of law." See also, Yacht 
Club v, Utah Liquor Control Commission, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 
(Utah 1984). The Commission's findings that mobile telephone 
services are subject to effective competition and that customers 
have reasonably available alternatives in each of the rate 
detariffed areas are supported by more than a residuum of legal 
evidence competent in a court of law. Such evidence includes 
testimony based upon personal knowledge (Rule 602 URE), expert 
opinion (Rule 702 URE) and other trustworthy statements excepted 
from the hearsay rule (Rule 803(24) URE). 
For example, Robert B. Capshaw's testimony that com-
petitive alternatives to Mountain Bell's mobile telephone ser-
vices were available in the Provo, Salt Lake, Ogden, Price and 
Vernal areas was based upon personal knowledge acquired as a 
Communications Engineer for the Utah Division of Public Utilities. 
R. 158. Personal knowledge was also adduced as evidence of the 
market shares of various mobile telephone services in Utah. The 
testimony of James H. Murphy, District Staff Manager of Product 
Development—Radio Services for Mountain Bell, that Mountain Bell 
was licensed by the Federal Communications Commission for 16 
channels in Utah was based upon personal knowledge. R. 26 & 35. 
The testimony of David R. Williams, Industrial's witness, that 
Industrial was licensed for 18 channels in Utah was also based 
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upon personal knowledge. R. 274-75. Evidence that Mobile 
Telephone was licensed for 23 channels was submitted by proffer 
of Mobile without objection. R. 335. 
The Commission also received evidence in the form of 
expert opinion testimony in support of its findings. Such evi-
dence is admissible pursuant to Rule 702 URE, which provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other spe-
cialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Mr. Murphy, Mr. Capshaw and Dr. Compton were each qualified to 
render expert opinions as to the competitive conditions of the 
mobile telephone market in Utah. The specialized knowledge of 
these witnesses clearly assisted the Commission in understanding 
the evidence and determining the facts in issue. 
In addition to being Mountain Bell's District Staff 
Manager of Product Development—Radio Services, Mr. Murphy held 
a B.S. in Industrial Marketing and Management from the University 
of Colorado, was a graduate of the Bell System Advanced Data 
Communications Course (R. 733) and was a 14 year veteran of the 
mobile telephone business. R. 108 & 732-33. His duties with 
Mountain Bell included the marketing, administration, and manage-
ment of mobile telephone services. R. 11. 
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Mr. Capshaw was a Communications Engineer for the 
Division of Public Utilities with 5 years experience in regu-
lating the mobile telephone business in Utah.—' R. 130. 
Dr. Compton was the Manager of Economists for the 
Division and held a Ph.D. in Economics with emphases in economic 
theory, monetary economics and public finance from U.C.L.A., and 
a B.S. in Mathematics, a B.S. in Psychology and an M.S. in 
Statistics from Brigham Young University. R. 800. He worked for 
11 years as an engineering probabilist at McDonnell Douglas 
Astronautics Co., was an independent consultant for two years and 
had been with the Division for eight years. Id. 
Industrial's claim that Mr. Murphy was a fact witness, 
not an expert witness (Br. 15), ignores Mr. Murphy's obvious 
qualifications and the informality of Commission proceedings. 
Clearly, Messrs. Murphy and Capshaw and Dr. Compton were qualified 
as experts and could have been formally so qualified had 
Industrial objected to their opinion testimony on the ground that 
they were not experts. Cf., Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall, 636 
P.2d 481, 486 (Utah 1981) (holding that record evidence supported 
acceptance of expert opinion testimony by Commissioner of 
Financial Institutions). 
— ' In fact, although not offered by way of qualification below, 
it was well known to the Commission and the parties that Mr. 
Capshaw's experience included 20 years as a telecommunications 
specialist in the Air Force, manager of an independent telephone 
company for several years and prior regulatory experience in the 
State of Washington. 
*** 
In forming their opinions, these expert witnesses relied 
both upon personal knowledge (R. 26 & 158) and upon information 
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in their fields. For 
example, Mr. Murphy based his opinions regarding the market 
shares of various mobile radio suppliers upon information con-
tained in the 1985 and 1986 Mobile Communications Handbook, The 
Complete Reference and Purchasing Guide for the Mobile Communi-
cations Industry, published by International Thompson Communica-
tions, Inc., publisher of other well-known industry sources. R. 
25. According to Rule 703 URE, 
The facts or data in the particular case 
upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made 
known to him at or before the hearing. If of 
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in 
the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data 
need not be admissible in evidence. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Thus, even if Mr. Murphy's testimony regarding information con-
tained in the Handbook constituted inadmissible hearsay, as 
Industrial contends, the information itself constituted proper 
foundation for the expert opinions of Mr. Murphy, Mr. Capshaw and 
Dr. Compton, and those opinions constitute legally competent evi-
dence supporting the Commission's findings. 
This legally competent and admissible evidence was 
supplemented by evidence from other sources carrying equivalent 
"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" and qualifying for 
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admission under Rule 803(24) URE. For example, Mr. Murphy's 
testimony as to the number of channels for which each mobile 
radio supplier was licensed was based upon information contained 
in the Handbook. Although the Handbook itself was not proffered, 
it was admissible in evidence under Rule 803(17) URE, an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule for "market quotations, tabulations, 
lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally 
used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular 
occupations." Thus, Mr. Murphy's testimony regarding the con-
tents of the Handbook was highly reliable and qualifies for 
exception from the hearsay rule under Rule 803(24) URE.—<-* 
The testimony of Mr. Capshaw as to the number of mobile 
telephones each of the regulated carriers had in service (R. 846) 
based upon his examination of the regulated carriers' 1985 Annual 
Reports (R. 342-43) was similarly admissible under Rule 803(24) 
URE. While Mr. Capshaw's testimony regarding the contents of 
annual reports may be deemed hearsay, it was nevertheless trust-
worthy. The Annual Reports were filed with the Commission 
—
/
 The information obtained by Mr. Murphy from the Handbook was 
subject to confirmation or refutation by other parties to the 
proceeding from their personal knowledge. Indeed, as shown 
above, both Industrial and Mobile adduced evidence of the actual 
number of channels they were licensed for, evidence which sup-
ports the Commission's findings that no single mobile telephone 
provider dominated the market, that there was effective com-
petition and that alternative providers were reasonably available 
to mobile telephone customers. 
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pursuant to the regulated carriers1 statutory obligation as 
public utilities (U.C.A. §§ 54-3-21 & 22 & 54-4-22) and are 
required to be made under oath. U.C.A. § 54-4-22. Copies of the 
annual reports themselves were clearly admissible as public 
records (Rule 803(8) URE) and, to the extent they contained 
statements made by and offered against opposing parties, as non-
hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2) URE. Moreover, the original reports 
were on file with a public office and readily available for 
inspection by any of the parties to the proceedings. To discount 
this evidence merely because the reports themselves were not 
introduced would be to exalt form over substance, without serving 
any legitimate purpose of the residuum rule. 
U.C.A. § 54-7-1 provides: 
In the conduct of proceedings before the 
Commission the technical rules of evidence 
need not be applied. No informality in any 
hearing, investigation or proceeding, or in 
the manner of taking testimony, shall invali-
date any order, decision, rule or regulation 
made, approved, or confirmed by the 
Commission. 
In Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 339 P.2d 1011 
(Utah 1959), referring to Section 54-7-1, the Court stated, 
It is to be remembered that there is con-
siderable difference between court trials and 
proceedings before administrative agencies. 
It is undisputable that the legislature 
intended that the latter should not be bur-
dened with formality. 
Id. at 1013-14. 
Industrials contention that the Commission relied 
solely on hearsay testimony inadmissible in a court of law is 
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without merit. The Commission's findings are well supported and 
are clearly supported by at least a residuum of competent legal 
evidence. The Report and Order should, therefore, be affirmed, 
CONCLUSION 
The Public Telecommunications Utility Law was enacted in 
1985 to provide the Commission with discretion and flexibility in 
regulating the expanding array of telecommunications services in 
increasingly competitive markets. Industrial's preference for 
regulation over competition has apparently compelled it to 
challenge the efficacy of the Commission's first significant 
decision under that Act on the grounds that the Commission did 
not strictly comply with every provision of the Act. Mountain 
Bell and NewVector contend and have demonstrated that the 
Commission did satisfy the strict requirements of the Act. More 
importantly, competent evidence was presented that the mobile 
telephone market is subject to effective competition in the seven 
areas of the state for which pricing flexibility was allowed. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court should grant 
deference to the Commission's interpretation of the Act and 
should not interpret it in a manner that renders it an unworkable 
tool. Consistent with legislative intent, the Act should be 
interpreted to allow the Commission to approach and decide new 
questions in new and creative ways consistent with the public 
interest. 
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The Report and Order is in the public interest and 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this 1% day of November, 1987. 
2D D. SMITH 
Utah General Attorney 
MOUNTAIN BELL 
250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 237-7415 
Attorney for the Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph 
Company 
WILLIAM H. CHRlSTENSEN 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street 
Twelfth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3 3 00 
Attorneys for U S WEST 
NewVector Group, Inc. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
STATUTES 
54-7-16. Certiorari — Findings conclusive — Exclusive ju-
risdiction of Supreme Court [Effective until Jan-
uary 1, 1988]. 
(1) Within 30 days after the application for a rehearing is denied, or, if the 
application is granted, within 30 days after the rendition of the decision on 
rehearing, the applicant or any party to the proceeding considering himself 
aggrieved by such order or decision rendered upon rehearing may apply to the 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari for the purpose of having the lawfulness 
of the original order or decision, or the order or decision on rehearing, in-
quired into and determined. Such writ shall be made returnable not later than 
30 days after the date of the issuance thereof, and shall direct the commission 
to certify its record in the case to the court. 
(2) Immediately after the service of the writ the commission shall cause 
notice of the pendency of the writ to be served upon each party to the action or 
proceeding in which the order or decision was rendered in the manner pro-
vided by § 54-7-9. 
(3) On the return day the cause shall be heard by the Supreme Court, 
unless for good reason shown the same is continued. No new or additional 
evidence may be introduced in the Supreme Court, but the cause shall be 
heard on the record of the commission as certified by it. The review shall not 
be extended further than to determine whether the commission has regularly 
pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the order or deci-
sion under review violates any right of the petitioner under the Constitution 
of the United States or of the state of Utah. The findings and conclusions of 
the commission on questions of fact shall be final and shall not be subject to 
review. Such questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings 
and conclusions of the commission on reasonableness and discrimination. 
(4) The commission and each party to the action or proceeding before the 
commission shall have the right to appear in the review proceedings. 
(5) Upon the hearing the Supreme Court shall enter judgment either af-
firming or setting aside the order or decision of the commission. 
(6) The provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to writs of review 
shall so far as applicable and not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter 
apply to proceedings instituted in the Supreme Court under the provisions of 
this section. 
(7) No court of this state (except the Supreme Court to the extent herein 
specified) shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct or annul any order 
or decision of the commission, or to suspend or delay the execution or opera-
tion thereof, or to enjoin, restrain or interfere with the commission in the 
performance of its official duties; provided, that the writ of mandamus shall 
lie from the Supreme Court to the commission in all proper cases. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 5, § 15; C.L. lating to certiorari and conclusive lindings and 
1917, § 4834; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 76-6-16; L. exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
1987, ch. 92, § 69. Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
Repealed effective January 1, 1988. —
 m e nt added the subsection designations and 
Laws 1987, ch. 161, § 314 repeals § 54-7-16, as
 m a c i e minor stylistic changes. 
enacted by Laws 1917, ch. 47, art. 5, § 15, re-
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CHAPTER 8b 
PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
UTILITY LAW 
Section 
54-8b-l. Short title. 
54-80-2. Definitions. 
54-8b-3. Commission jurisdiction over tele-
communications — Exemptions 
from title allowed — Hearings 
and findings — Approval pe-
riod. 
54-8b-4. Commission order — Negotiated 
provision of services — Compet-
itive contracts. 
54-8b-l. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Public Telecommunications Utility Law." 
History: C. 1953, 54-3b-l, enacted by L. 
1985, cho 257, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d» — 74 Am. Jur. 2d Telecommu- Key Numbers. — Telecommunications ^ 5, 
nications § 18 et seq. 6, 7. 
C.J.S. — 86 C.J.S. Telegraphs, Telephones, 
Radio and Television § 74 et seq. 
54-8h-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Commission" means the Public Service Commission. 
(2) "Intrastate telecommunications service" means any telecommuni-
cations service in which the information transmitted originates and ter-
minates within the boundaries of this state. 
(3) "Public telecommunications services" means the transmission of 
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, messages, data, or other informa-
tion of any nature by wire, radio, lightwaves, or other electromagnetic 
means offered to the public generally. 
(4) "Telecommunications corporation" means every corporation and 
person, their lessees, trustees, receivers, or trustees appointed by any 
court, owning, controlling, operating, managing, or reselling a public 
telecommunications service. 
History: C. 1953, 54-8b-2, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 257, § 1. 
Section 
54-8b-5. Notice of application for approval of 
contract — Hearing. 
54-8b-6. Subsidization of non-regulated ser-
vices not allowed. 
54-8b-7. Continuous jurisdiction of commis-
sion — Orders. 
54-8b-8. Antitrust and restraint of trade laws 
not affected by chapter. 
54-8b-9. Commission's jurisdiction under 
other provisions of title not 
enlarged or reduced by chapter. 
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54-8b-3. Commission jurisdiction over telecommunica-
tions — Exemptions from title allowed — Hear-
ings and findings — Approval period. 
(1) The commission is vested with power and jurisdiction to partially or 
wholly exempt from any requirement of this title any telecommunications 
corporation or public telecommunications service in this state. 
(2) The commission, on its own initiative or in response to an application by 
a telecommunications corporation or a user of a public telecommunications 
service, may, after public notice and an opportunity for a hearing, make find-
ings and issue an order specifying its requirements, terms, and conditions 
exempting any telecommunications corporation or any public telecommunica-
tions service from any requirement of this title either for a specific geographic 
area or in the entire state if the commission finds that the telecommunica-
tions corporation or service is subject to effective competition, that customers 
of the telecommunications corporation or service have reasonably available 
alternatives, and that the telecommunications corporation or service does not 
serve a captive customer base, and if such exemption is in the public interest 
of the citizens of the state. In determining whether to exempt any telecommu-
nications corporation or public telecommunications service from any require-
ment of this title, the commission shall consider all relevant factors including, 
but not limited to: (a) the number of other providers offering similar services; 
(b) the intrastate market power and market share within the state of Utah of 
the telecommunications corporation requesting an exemption; (c) the intra-
state market power and market share of other providers; (d) the existence of 
other providers to make functionally equivalent services readily available at 
competitive rates, terms, and conditions; (e) the effect of exemption on the 
regulated revenue requirements of the telecommunications corporation re-
questing an exemption; (f) the ease of entry of other providers into the mar-
ketplace; (g) the overall impact of exemption on the public interest; (h) the 
integrity of all service providers in the proposed market; (i) the cost of provid-
ing such service; (j) the economic impact on existing telecommunications cor-
porations; and (k) whether competition will promote the provision of adequate 
services at just and reasonable rates. 
(3) The commission shall approve or deny any application for exemption 
under this section within 240 days, except that the commission may by order 
defer action for an additional 30-day period. If the commission has not acted 
on any application within the permitted time period, the application shall be 
deemed granted. 
History: C. 1953, 54-8b-3, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 257, § 1. 
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54-8b-4. Commission order — Negotiated provision of ser-
vices — Competitive contracts. 
(1) The commission may enter an order partially or wholly exempting any 
public telecommunications service from any requirement of this title as to 
rates, tariffs, or fares and may authorize the provision of all or any portion of 
a public telecommunications service under stated or negotiated terms to any 
person that is committed to the acquisition of, through construction, lease, or 
any other form of acquisition, comparable telecommunications services from 
an alternative source of supply 
(2) Telecommunications corporations may negotiate with the person or en-
tity for the provision of public telecommunications services without regard to 
the provisions of any tariffs on file and approved by the commission, but any 
rate, toll, fare, rental, charge, or classification of service in such contracts 
shall be fully compensatory 
(3) Within ten days after the conclusion of the negotiations and prior to the 
execution of any contract, the telecommunications corporation shall file with 
the commission the proposed final agreements and other evidence of the pub-
lic telecommunications services to be provided together with the charges and 
other conditions of the service The commission may approve or deny an appli-
cation for approval of a competitive contract within 30 days of the filing of the 
application by the telecommunications corporation or the final contract shall 
become effective The commission, in consideration of approval of the competi-
tive contract, shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, 
whether the contract for any rate, toll, fare, rental, charge, or classification of 
service covers the cost of providing such service, provides for adequate service 
at just and reasonable rates, and does not have significant adverse effects 
upon the integrity of other telecommunications corporations After a competi-
tive contract has become effective the commission, in the next general rate 
case for that telecommunications corporation, shall review the contract, con-
sistent with the factors stated in this subsection, and oh ill make any adjust-
ment in its rate order, including, but not limited to rett oactive adjustment, 
deemed necessary by the commission to avoid cross subsidization from other 
regulated intrastate telecommunications services Any costs incurred in ful-
filling the terms of a competitive contract may not be recovered from the 
regulated rate base 
(4) Any telecommunications corporation that provides public telecommuni-
cations services under a competitive contract may not offer the services under 
contract in a manner that unfairly discriminates between customers 
History: C. 1953, 54-8b-4, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 257, § 1. 
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54-8b-5. Notice of application for approval of contract — 
Hearing. 
The telecommunications corporation making application for approval of a 
contract shall publish notice of that application under rules enacted by the 
commission. The commission, at its discretion or in response to a protested 
application, may hold a hearing as provided in §§ 54-7-10 and 54-7-12, and 
the 30-day time limit of § 54-8b-3 does not apply. 
History: C. 1963, 54-8b-5, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 257, § 1. 
54-8b-6. Subsidization of non-regulated services not al-
lowed. 
A telecommunications corporation providing intrastate public telecommu-
nications services may not subsidize from those services subject to regulation 
under this chapter services which are not regulated. 
History: C. 1953, 54-8b-6, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 257, § 1. 
54-8b-7. Continuous jurisdiction of commission — Orders, 
The commission shall retain continuous jurisdiction over every telecommu-
nications corporation or public telecommunications service exempted under 
this chapter and may exercise any statutory grant of power pertaining 
thereto, including the power to revoke or modify any order approving an 
exemption from regulation. The commission, may, after notice and hearing, 
revoke or modify an order approving exemption, if after considering the fac-
tors in Subsection 54-8b-3 (2), the commission finds such modification or revo-
cation to be in the public interest. 
History: C. 1953, 54-8b-7, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 257, § 1. 
54-8b-8. Antitrust and restraint of trade laws not affected 
by chapter. 
Nothing in this chapter shall in any way preempt, modify, exempt, abro-
gate, or otherwise affect any right, cause of action, liability, duty, or obliga-
tion arising from any federal, state, or local law governing unfair business 
practices or antitrust, restraint of trade, or other anti-competitive activity. 
History: C. 1953, 54-8b-8, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 257, § 1. 
A-5 
54-8b-9. Commission's jurisdiction under other provisions 
of title not enlarged or reduced by chapter. 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to enlarge or reduce the commis-
sion's jurisdiction over the services and entities for which jurisdiction is pro-
vided or excluded by other provisions of this title. 
History: C. 1953, 54-8b-9, enacted by L. 
1986, ch„ 257, § 1. 
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ADDENDUM B 
REPORT AND ORDER 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Petition 
of THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY for Exemp-
tion from Regulation of Mobile 
Radio Service and Rural Radio 
Service* 
CASE NOS, 85-049-09 
85-999-19 
REPORT AND ORDER 
Appearances: 
Ted D, Smith 
Keith E. Taylor 
Jon C. Heaton 
Gregory B. Monson 
Brian W. Burnett, 
Assistant Attorney 
General 
By the Commission: 
ISSUED: April 17, 1987 
For The Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph 
Company 
" David Williams, dba 
Industrial Communications 
" Daniels and Associates 
" U S West NewVector Group, 
Inc. 
" Division of Public 
Utilities, Department of 
Business Regulation, 
State of Utah 
BACKGROUND 
This matter was initiated on August 9, 1985 by a 
Petition filed by The Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph 
Company (Mountain Bell) seeking an order exempting it from 
regulation with regard to Mobile Radio Service and Rural Radio 
Service. The Petition was filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 
54-8b-l et seq. The docket was assigned Case No. 85-049-09. 
Mountain Bell prefiled the direct testimony and exhibits of James 
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H. Murphy at the time the Petition was filed. On August 19, 
1985, NewVector Communications, Inc. filed a Motion to Intervene. 
NewVector later changed its name to U S West NewVector Group, 
Inc. (NewVector). On August 20, 1985, David R. Williams dba 
Industrial Communications (Industrial) filed a Notice of Inter-
vention and Protest. On August 23, 1985 Mobile Telephone, Inc. 
(Mobile) filed a Notice of Intervention and Protest. Mobile was 
later acquired by Daniels and Associates (Daniels) . In a Pre-
hearing Conference in September, 1985, the Commission concluded 
that this matter should be treated as a generic proceeding so 
that the deregulation of radio services of other companies in 
Utah could be considered. Therefore, it was assigned Case No. 
85-999-19, a generic docket number. Hearing dates were estab-
lished for March 4, 1986, and the Division was ordered to notify 
all other providers of rural and mobile radio services in the 
State of Utah of the proceeding. 
On January 9, 1986, Mountain Bell and the Division 
filed a joint motion for a continuance on the ground that Moun-
tain Bell had not completed development and implementation of an 
accounting system to separate regulated from unregulated ser-
vices. The hearing date was vacated and a further Prehearing 
Conference was set for August 5, 1986. 
At the Prehearing Conference on August 5, 1986, Moun-
tain Bell indicated that, in light of the fact that its account-
ing system still had not been fully implemented, it was changing 
its request for relief in this matter from full exemption from 
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all regulation by the Commission to a request that the Commission 
merely detariff the rate levels for fixed rural and mobile radio 
services. The Commission concluded that Mounta i n Bell did not 
need to file a new petition since the detariffing of rate levels 
was contemplated by the original petition. A hearing was 
scheduled for November, 1986. 
Hearings were held on November 13 and 14, 1986 and on 
January 20, 1987. Mountain Bell presented the direct testimony 
of Mr. James Murphy. The Division presented tine direct 
testimony of * Robert Capshaw and Dr. George Compton. Indus-
trial presented the testimony of Mr. David Williams. Daniels 
presented evidence by way of proffer which was received without 
objection, Later in the proceeding. Mountain Bell presented 
rebuttal testimony by Mr. Larry Fuller and Mr. Murphy. The 
Division presented additional testimony of Mr. Capshaw and 
Industrial presented rebuttal testimony of Mr. Williams. Final 
argument was presented to the Commission on January 20, 1986. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This case presents the first opportunity for the 
Commission comprehensively to construe and apply the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-8b-l et. seq., the statute enacted by the 
Utah Legislature in 1985, which authorizes us to exempt certain 
telecommunication services or companies from regulation. 
The issue before us in this proceeding is whether the 
record supports the detariffing of rate levels for mobile and 
rural radio services. It is our conclusion that the facts before 
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us support the detariffing of rates for mobile service in the 
following cities and their surrounding areas: Moab, Monticeiio, 
Ogden, Salt Lake City, Provo, Price and Vernal, The record does 
not support the detariffing of rates for rural radio services at 
this time. 
Section 54-8b-3 of the statutes states: 
(1) The commission is vested with power 
and jurisdiction to partially or wholly 
exempt from any requirement of this title any 
telecommunications corporation or public 
telecommunications service in this state. 
(2) The commission, on its own initia-
tive or in response to an application by a 
telecommunications corporation or a user of a 
public telecommunications service, may, after 
public notice and an opportunity for a 
hearing, make findings and issue an order 
specifying its requirements, terms, and 
conditions exempting any telecommunications 
corporation or any public telecommunications 
service from any requirement of this title 
either for a specific geographic area or in 
the entire state if the Commission finds that 
the telecommunications corporation or service 
is subject to effective, competition, that 
customers of the telecommunications corpo-
ration or service have reasonably available 
alternatives, and that the telecommunications 
corporation or service does not serve a 
captive customer base, and if such exemption 
is in the public interest of the citizens of 
the state. 
In determining whether to exempt any tele-
communications corporation or public tele-
communications service from any requirement 
of this title, the commission shall consider 
all relevant factors including, but not 
limited to: (a) the number of other provid-
ers offering similar services; (b) the 
intrastate market power and market share 
within the state of Utah of the telecommu-
nications corporation requesting an ex-
emption; (c) the intrastate market power and 
market share of other providers; (d) the 
existence of other providers to make 
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functionally equivalent services readily 
available at competitive rates, terms, and 
conditions; (e) the effect of exemption on 
the regulated revenue requirements of the 
telecommunications corporation requesting an 
exemption; (f) the ease of entry of other 
providers into the marketplace; (g) the 
overall impact of exemption on the public 
interest; (h) the integrity of all service 
providers in the proposed market; (i) the 
cost of providing such service; (j) the 
economic impact on existing telecommunica-
tions corporation; and (k) whether competi-
tion will promote the provision of adequate 
services at just and reasonable rates. 
Subsection (1) establishes the authority of the Commission to 
exempt wholly or in part; any .requirement of Title 54, Such 
exemption can range from total exemption of every requirement of 
Title 54 (in effect, total deregulation of a Company or service) 
to exempting specific requirements of the law, in which case the 
utility or service will remain subject to all other requirements 
of the law. In this case, we are presented with a petition to 
exempt from regulation the requirement to file and gain prior 
approval for price levels for mobile and rural radio services. 
Even if the Petition is granted, the services will remain subject 
to regulation as to quality , safety, facilities, and other 
non-price conditions of service; in the case of telephone corpo-
rations (like Mountain Bell) that provide other regulated ser-
vices, rate base, expenses and revenues of mobile telephone 
service will continue to be included in ratemaking. 
The telecommunications industry is changing rapidly and 
dramatically through technological change as well as through 
judicial, administrative, and statutory activity on both a state 
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and federal level. That the Legislature intended the statue to 
be a flexible tool is evidenced by Section 54-8b-7: 
The commission shall retain continuous 
jurisdiction over every telecommunications 
corporation or public telecommunications 
service exempted under this chapter and may 
exercise any statutory grant of power per-
taining thereto, including the power to 
revoke or modify any order approving an 
exemption from regulation. The commission, 
may, after notice and hearing, revoke or 
modify an order approving exemption, if after 
considering the factors in Subsection 
54-8b-3(2), the commission finds such modi-
fication or revocation to be in the public 
interest. 
(Emphasis added). Under this section, no exemption order is 
final in the sense that the Commission is precluded from revoking 
it. The Commission has the authority to continue to monitor 
developments in a particular market and, if necessary, can 
re-regulate a service. This, as well as the fact that the 
Coiranission can allow exemption subject to nrequirements, terms, 
and conditions," (§54-8b-3(2)) is clearly indicative of a legis-
lative intent that the statute be a flexible tool for the Commis-
sion to use. 
Section 54-8b-3(2) sets forth four findings that the 
Commission must make to support an exemption from regulation for 
a service: 
1. The service is subject to effective competition; 
2. Customers of the service have reasonably available 
alternatives; 
3. The service does not serve a captive customer base; and 
4. Exemption is in the public interest. 
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Each criterion has words that are not otherwise defined. For 
example: What is "effective" competition? What is a "reasonably 
available alternative"? What is a "captive customer base"? What 
is the definition of the public interest? The Commission has 
obviously been granted substantial discretion to define these 
terms in the context n\ j particular set of facts, We do not 
intend to attempt to define these terms in the abstract — by 
their nature they cannot be so defined in the absence of specific 
facts to test them against. 
In addition to the four criteria, Section 54-8b-3(2) 
contains additional matters for the Commission's consideration. 
The relevant portion state si 
In determining whether to exempt any 
telecommunications corporation or public 
telecommunications service from any require-
ment of this title, the commission shall 
consider all relevant factors including/ but 
not limited to: (a) the number of other 
providers offering similar services; (b) the 
intrastate market power and market share 
within the state of Utah of the telecommu-
nications corporation requesting an ex-
emption; (c) the intrastate market power and 
market share of other providers; (d) the 
existence of other providers to make func-
tionally equivalent services readily avail-
able at competitive rates, terms, and con-
ditions; (e) the effect of exemption on the 
regulated revenue requirements of the tele-
communications corporation requesting an 
exemption; (f) the ease of entry of other 
providers into the marketplace; (g) the 
overall impact of exemption on the public 
interest; (h) the integrity of all service 
providers in the proposed market; (i) the 
cost of providing such service; (j) the 
economic impact on existing telecommunica-
tions corporations; and (k) whether competi-
tion will promote the provision of adequate 
services at just and reasonable rates. 
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(Emphasis added). 
Industrial argued that specific factual evidence must 
be presented as to each of the items set forth above and that the 
Commission has a duty to make explicit factual findings as to 
each. This is an erroneous reading of the statute. The statute 
makes it clear that the Commission may exempt from regulation if 
it "finds11 that the four essential criteria are met (i.e. effec-
tive competition, reasonably available alternatives, no captive 
customer base, exemption is in the public interest). These are 
the only four issues upon which the Commission must make explicit 
findings. The' additional factors to be considered are not 
separate and apart from the four essential criteria. Indeed, it 
is obvious that they are included in the statute as factors that 
the Commission is to bear in mind in making its findings and 
conclusions as to the four essential criteria. If the position 
advanced by Industrial were correct, then the four essential 
criteria would be rendered essentially superfluous. By expressly 
requiring findings as to the four, but merely indicating that the 
others shall be considered, the Legislature is indicating its 
intent that the latter are to serve as a general guide of rele-
vant questions to examine but is not necessarily indicating that 
all of the criteria are necessarily relevant in a given case. 
Indeed, the statute indicates that other criteria in a given case 
may be relevant. One thing is completely clear: the Legisla-
ture is not requiring separate findings as to each of the fac-
tors. 
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Furthermore, examination of the additional factors 
demonstrates that it would be virtually impossible to reduce some 
of them to factual testimony or to precise factual conclusions. 
Many of them are obviously general policy consideration that 
cannot be expressed in precise factual terms. Thus, while the 
Commission needs to bear these factors in mind, there is no legal 
requirement to make explicit factual findings as to each. 
Industrial and Daniels claim that Mountain Bell failed 
to meet its burden of proof for exemption under the statute. The 
position of Industrial and, Daniels In opposition to detariffing 
of rates is based on a reading of Section 54-8b-3 that is much 
too restrictive, both in terms of the letter and spirit of the 
law. The only facts Industrial and Daniels apparently believe 
should be considered in determining whether to grant an exemption 
from regulation are those presented by Mountain Bell, Even if 
this were not a generic proceeding, we would disagree with this 
argument. Proceedings under the statute may be commenced by the 
Commission, the Division, a telephone corporation or a consumer. 
No matter how the proceedings are commenced, it is the duty of 
the Commission to become fully advised so that it may act in the 
public interest. Therefore, we do not regard proceedings under 
the statute as placing a burden on any particular party. This is 
even more the case where, as here, we are engaging in a generic 
proceeding regarding the possible partial deregulation of all 
providers of the service. Our findings and conclusions may be 
based in the totality of the evidence presented to the Commission 
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fay all parties, including that presented by the Division, Indus-
trial and Daniels. 
Industrial and Daniels attacked at some lengths the 
exhibits presented by Mr, Murphy to demonstrate the competitive-
ness of the marketplace, Mr, Murphy made it clear that much of 
the information in his exhibits was based on published sources 
which he, as an experienced manager in the mobile radio market-
place, believed were reliable. He acknowledged that he did not 
have personal knowledge concerning some of the information. 
Industrial and Daniels introduced evidence that certain of the 
numbers in the exhibit were incorrect. While this evidence 
demonstrated inaccuracies in Mr. Murphy's exhibits, it corrob-
orated the intent and thrust of such exhibits. In its totality, 
the evidence in this matter shows that effective competition for 
mobile service does exist in the seven areas set forth above. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mobile radio service is a two-way communications 
service furnished through a base station between a wireline 
telephone and a mobile unit or between two mobile units. 
2. Several types of entities offer functionally 
equivalent types of mobile radio service. These include Radio 
Communication Carriers (RCCs) such as Daniels and Industrial, 
Wireline Communications Carriers (WCCs) such as Mountain Bell and 
Continental Telephone, Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) providers, 
Cellular Carriers such as NewVector and Salt Lake City Cellular, 
as well as owners of private systems. We note that intrastate 
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cellular telephone service, at least in the Salt Lake SMSA, will 
be free of all regulatory restraints as of September of this year 
pursuant to Section 54-2-30, Utah Code. 
3. In the Salt Lake City area, functionally equivalent 
mobile radio service is offered by Mountain Bell, Industial, 
Daniels, some SMR providers, NewVector, and Salt Lake City 
Cellular* In Salt Lake City, Mountain Bell has six radio chan-
nels, Industrial has eleven and Daniels has t-en. WhiJe there is 
not an exact correlation between radio channels and market share, 
there is a general relationship; the more radio channels, the 
more traffic that can be served. 1 On a total state basis, 
Industrial has i81 raobiJe customers, Daniels has 234 and Mountain 
Bell has 393; the record also shows that on a total state basis, 
Industrial has 18 channels, Daniels has 23 and Mountain Bell has 
16. Industrial testified that Mountain Bell's share of the Salt 
Lake City area market was 30 to 40 percent. In addition, the 
evidence demonstrated that SMRs have the capability of offering 
services equivalent to the mobile services offered by Mountain 
Bell, Daniels, and Industrial and that SMRs are operating in the 
Salt Lake City area. The record also shows that Cellular carri-
ers in the Salt Lake City are are in operation and that they are 
serving numerous customers. 
4. The facts demonstrate that in the Salt Lake City 
area: 
a. Mobile radio services are subject to effective 
competition. 
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b. Customers desiring such services have reasonable 
alternatives that are readily available to them. 
c. No provider of such service serves a captive 
customer base. 
5. In the Ogden area, functionally equivalent mobile 
radio service is offered to the public by Mountain Bell, Daniels, 
Industrial, NewVector, Salt Lake City Cellular and at least one 
SMR. While neither Daniels nor Industrial has radio channels in 
Ogden, their radio systems provide mobile service in the Ogden 
area through their transmitters located in the Oquirrh Mountains, 
Both Industrial and Daniels are certificated to serve the Ogden 
area and both hold themselves out through advertisements as 
providing mobile service in the Ogden area. Through their 
tariffs, both Industrial and Daniels are obligated to provide 
service to customers requesting such service in the Ogden area. 
6. The facts demonstrate that in the Ogden area: 
a. Mobile radio services are subject to effective 
competition. 
b. Customers desiring such services have reasonable 
alternatives that are readily available to them. 
c. No provider of such service serves a captive 
customer base. 
7. In the Provo area, functionally equivalent mobile 
radio service is offered to the public by Mountain Bell, Daniels, 
Industrial, and at least one SMR. While neither Daniels nor 
Industrial has radio channels in Provo, their radio systems 
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provide mobile service in the Provo area through their transmit-
ters located in the Oquirrh Mountains. Both Industrial and 
Daniels are certificated to serve the Provo area and both hold 
themselves out through advertisements as providing mobile service 
in the Provo area. Through their tariffs, both Industrial and 
Daniels are obligated to provide service to customers requesting 
such service in the Provo area. We are also aware that cellular 
service will also be offered in Provo in the future, 
8. The facts demonstrate that in the Provo area: 
a. Mobile radio services are subject to effective 
competition. 
fa, Customers desiring such services have reasonable 
alternatives that are readily available to them, 
c. No provider of such service serves a captive 
customer base. 
9. In the Vernal area, functionally equivalent mobile 
radio service is offered to the public by Mountain Bell, Indus-
trial as well as two SMR providers. In Vernal, Mountain Bell has 
four radio channels and Industrial has seven. The testimony 
indicated that the market in Vernal was split fairly evenly 
between Industrial and Mountain Bell. 
10. The facts demonstrate that in the Vernal area: 
a. Mobile radio services are subject to effective 
competition. 
b. Customers desiring such services have reasonable 
alternatives that are readily available to them. 
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c. No provider of such service serves a captive 
customer base. 
11. In the Price area, functionally equivalent mobile 
radio service is offered by Mountain Bell and by Royce's Elec-
tronics. Royce's Electronics is a certificated mobile carrier in 
the Price area and holds itself out as providing such services in 
that area. 
12. The facts demonstrate that in the Price area: 
a. Mobile radio services are subject to effective 
competition. 
b. Customers desiring such services have reasonable 
alternatives that are readily available to them. 
c. No provider of such service serves a captive 
customer base. 
13. In the Moab and Monticello areas, functionally 
equivalent mobile radio service is offered by Continental Tele-
phone and Royce's Electronics. Both are certificated mobile 
carriers who hold themselves out as providing such services in 
those areas. 
14. The facts demonstrate that in the Moab and 
Monticello areas: 
a. Mobile radio services are subject to effective 
competition. 
b. Customers desiring such services have reasonable 
alternatives that are readiiv available to them. 
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c. No provider of such service serves a captive 
customer base. 
15. As to all of the areas above listed, we find that 
exempting mobile radio service from the requirements of filing 
and gaining prior approval of rate levels is in the public 
interest. In so concluding we note that the facts in the record 
demonstrate that: 
a. In each of these market areas, there are at least 
two separate entities offering similar services. 
b. In each of these areas, customers and potential 
customers can choose between one or more providers. 
Even though in the Ogden and Provo areas Industrial and 
Mobile claim they have no customers, they also acknowl-
edged that they have not attempted to actively market 
in those areas. Nevertheless, they do serve those areas 
and are obligated to serve. In Ogden, cellular service 
is provided by NewVector and Salt Lake City Cellular. 
Cellular licenses have been granted in the Provo area 
to two companies. There is no evidence that Mountain 
Bell has the kind of market power that would allow it 
to dictate whatever price it chooses. In all the other 
areas, it was clear that no one entity dominated either 
market share or has market power. Just examining the 
number of mobile customers served by each provider 
makes it clear that no one entity has either a dominant 
market share or market power. Mountain Bell, the 
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applicant in this matter, has fewer mobile customers 
than Industrial. Mountain Bell has fewer radio chan-
nels than either Daniels or Industrial. 
c. SMR providers, RCCs, WCCs, Cellular providers and 
private systems all provide mobile radio services that 
are functionally equivalent — all provide intercon-
nection to the public switched network for mobile 
customers. While the rate structures of the various 
players in each market vary somewhat, they are general-
ly offered at competitive rates, terms and conditions. 
d. Detariffing of rate levels will not adversely 
affect the regulated revenue requirements of Mountain 
Bell. Indeed, the purpose of exemption is to allow it 
the opportunity to remain viable in the marketplace. 
e. There are no legal barriers of entry to become a 
provider of mobile services. SMR providers may enter 
the market without legal restriction. Although the 
matter is currently on appeal, the FCC recently issued 
an order in Docket No. 85-89 reempting state regulation 
of entry into the mobile radio marketplace. Further-
more, we find no prohibitive financial burden to enter 
the market. The recent entry of new providers of such 
service demonstrates the ease of market entry. 
f. The mobile radio service market is an expanding 
one. Virtually all providers are expanding their 
number of available channels. The facts indicate that 
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the current providers of such services are financially 
sound. 
g. As part of our regulatory oversight, we must assure 
that the mobile service of Mountain Bell or other 
carriers is not subsidized by other regulated services. 
Mountain Bell has committed to provide its mobile 
services above its direct costs. As part of our 
regulatory oversight role in the ratemaking process for 
Mountain Bell's regulated services, we will, in future 
ratemaking proceedings, assure ourselves that these 
commitments are met. While cost may be a relevant 
factor in our ongoing oversight role, we do not believe 
it is necessary or relevant that we review specific 
cost data to determine whether exemption should be 
allowed, since, as Dr. Compton correctly points out, if 
it can be shown that a market is competitive ,fa regu-
latory decision to grant pricing flexibility requires 
no specific knowledge about the providers' costs." 
h. While it is impossible to predict the effect 
exemption will have on existing suppliers, it is 
reasonable to believe that detariffing will result in 
declining prices. How this will affect other suppliers 
will depend on how each responds in the competitive 
marketplace. We have no reason to believe that detar-
iffing will result in any provider gaining dominance in 
the market. Dr. Compton testified that in his opinion 
B-17 
CASE NOS. 35-049-09 and 85-999-19 
- 18 -
Mountain Bell will have no incentive to engage in 
anticompetitive pricing because of the Commission's 
continuing regulatory oversight of its costs and 
revenues in connection with ratemaJcing and because of 
potential liability under the federal antitrust laws, 
i. Detariffing will provide positive benefits to 
customers. By explicitly allowing price competition in 
the areas set forth above, we believe the result will 
be better service at competitive rates. To the extent 
detariffing results in adverse public impacts, we will 
not hesitate to consider re-regulation. 
16. Based on all the facts in the record, the Commis-
sion concludes that detariffing of mobile rates in the seven 
areas will promote competitive pricing conditions that are just 
and reasonable. Detariffing is therefore in the public interest. 
17. Rural radio service is utilized to provide the 
final link of a customer's service by radio link rather than 
through wire. 
18. Rural radio service, while provided via radio, is 
more closely akin to basic exchange service than to mobile 
service. We are not convinced on the basis of this record that 
there is sufficient competition for the provision of such service 
and therefore decline to detariff rates for the service at this 
time. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Our conclusions regarding §§ 5 4-8b-l et seq. 
contained in the General Discussion section of this Report and 
Order are hereby incorporated herein by reference. 
2. The Commission concludes that as to Moab, 
Monticello, Ogden, Salt Lake City, Provo, Price, Vernal and their 
surrounding areas, there is effective competition for the pro-
vision of mobile telephone service, that customers have rea-
sonably available alternatives, that suppliers do not service 
captive customer bases and that detariffing of rates is in the 
public interest. 
3. As to rural radio services, the Commission con-
cludes that the service does not meet the requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. §54-8b-3(2). 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That: 
1. Effective immediately, regulated suppliers of 
mobile telephone service in the following cities and surrounding 
areas, may remove rate levels from their tariffs: 
Moab Monticello 
Ogden Salt Lake City 
Provo Price 
Vernal 
Such suppliers need not seek prior approval of changes in rates 
for mobile telephone service. 
2. Rate levels for rural radio service shall continue 
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to be tariffed and subject to all regulatory requirements of 
Title 54. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of April, 
1987. 
/s/ Brian T. Stewart, Chairman 
(SEAL) I si Brent H. Cameron Commissioner 
/s/ James M. Byrne, Commissioner 
Attest: 
I si Stephen C. Hewlett, Secretary 
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